Template-type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Author-Name: Manjira Datta
Author-Email: Manjira.Datta@asu.edu
Author-Homepage: http://wpcarey.asu.edu/Directory/stafffaculty.cfm?cobid=1039626
Author-Workplace-Name: W. P. Carey School of Business Department of Economics
Author-Workplace-Homepage: http://wpcarey.asu.edu/ecn/
Author-Name: Tito Cordella
Author-Email: 
Author-Homepage: http://wpcarey.asu.edu/Directory/stafffaculty.cfm?cobid=2133550
Author-Workplace-Name: International Monetary Fund
Author-Workplace-Homepage: 

Title: Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium:  An Illustration
Abstract: In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., moving towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., moving away from the Walrasian amount).		
Classification-JEL: C72, C73, D43, D90
Keywords: 
File-URL:http://wpcarey.asu.edu/tools/mytools/pubs_admin/FILES/wp97_13.pdf
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Handle: RePec:asu:wpaper:2132843